This
 meeting
 ended
 at
 4:20,
 and
 preparations
 for
 the
 attack
 accelerated. Expecting
 I
 would
 be
 in
 the
 White
 House
 all
 night,
 I
 went
 home
 at
 about 5:30
to
get
a
change
of
clothes
and
return.
Dunford
had
confirmed
7:00
p.m. was
 the
 go/no
 go
 point
 for
 the
 strike
 against
 the
 three
 Iranian
 sites,
 so
 I figured
 I
 had
 plenty
 of
 time
 before
 the
 9:00
 p.m.
 hit.
 I
 called
 Trump
 from the
Secret
Service
SUV
at
about
5:35
and
told
him
everything
was
on
track. “Okay,”
 he
 said,
 “let’s
 go.”
 I
 talked
 to
 Shanahan
 at
 5:40
 about
 the
 kind
 of statements
 he
 and
 Dunford
 would
 make
 at
 the
 Pentagon
 once
 the
 attacks concluded
 and
 whether
 they
 should
 take
 questions
 or
 just
 read
 written statements.
 I
 reached
 home,
 changed
 clothes,
 and
 turned
 around immediately,
running
into
heavy
inbound
traffic
on
the
George
Washington Memorial
 Parkway.
 As
 I
 was
 riding
 in,
 Shanahan
 called
 with
 what
 turned out
 to
 be
 an
 erroneous
 report
 that
 the
 UK
 embassy
 in
 Iran
 had
 been attacked,
 and
 that
 he
 and
 Dunford
 had
 decided
 to
 delay
 the
 time-on-target point
to
10:00
p.m.
The
source
of
this
information
was
a
UK
liaison
officer at
 the
 Joint
 Chiefs
 of
 Staff,
 but
 Shanahan
 said
 Pompeo
 was
 checking
 (and determined
 that
 it
 was
 a
 trivial
 automobile
 accident).
 I
 couldn’t
 believe
 the Pentagon
 had
 changed
 the
 time
 of
 attack
 entirely
 on
 its
 own,
 especially based
 on
 the
 scanty
 information
 involved.
 I
 called
 Trump
 to
 say
 we
 might have
 to
 postpone
 the
 attack
 for
 an
 hour,
 although
 we
 were
 still
 checking things
out.
Trump
also
didn’t
understand
why
we
had
to
delay
things,
but
he didn’t
object.
I
 called
 Dunford
 just
 after
 hanging
 up
 with
 Trump
 and
 was
 told
 the
 two of
them
were
talking.
Worried
now
that
perhaps
Shanahan
and
Dunford
had gotten
 cold
 feet,
 I
 called
 Pompeo
 (who
 was
 at
 his
 residence)
 to
 compare notes.
 He
 thought
 Shanahan
 and
 Dunford
 were
 panicking,
 and
 were completely
 out
 of
 line;
 they
 had
 argued
 to
 him
 we
 should
 wait
 a
 couple
 of days,
 in
 light
 of
 the
 “attack”
 on
 the
 British
 embassy,
 to
 see
 if
 we
 could
 get the
 Brits
 to
 join
 the
 retaliation
 (although
 in
 light
 of
 subsequent
 events,
 this idea
 never
 went
 any
 further).
 It
 got
 worse.
 As
 Pompeo
 and
 I
 were
 talking, the
 Sit
 Room
 broke
 in
 to
 say
 Trump
 wanted
 to
 have
 a
 conference
 call
 with the
 two
 of
 us,
 Shanahan,
 and
 Dunford.
 Trump
 came
 on
 the
 line
 at
 perhaps 7:20
(I
was
now
slowly
crossing
the
Roosevelt
Bridge
across
the
Potomac)
to
 say
 he
 had
 decided
 to
 call
 the
 strikes
 off
 because
 they
 were
 not “proportionate.”
“A
hundred
fifty
to
one,”
he
said,
and
I
thought
perhaps
he was
 referring
 to
 the
 number
 of
 missiles
 we
 might
 fire
 compared
 to
 the
 one Iranian
 missile
 that
 had
 brought
 down
 the
 Global
 Hawk.
 Instead,
 Trump said
 he
 had
 been
 told
 by
 someone
 unnamed
 there
 might
 be
 a
 hundred
 fifty Iranian
 casualties.
 “Too
 many
 body
 bags,”
 said
 Trump,
 which
 he
 was
 not willing
to
risk
for
an
unmanned
drone—“Not
proportionate,”
he
said
again. Pompeo
tried
to
reason
with
him,
but
he
wasn’t
having
it.
Saying
we
could always
strike
later,
Trump
cut
the
discussion
off,
repeating
he
didn’t
want
to have
 a
 lot
 of
 body
 bags
 on
 television.
 I
 tried
 to
 change
 his
 mind,
 but
 I
 got nowhere.
I
said
I
was
nearing
the
White
House
and
would
come
to
the
Oval when
I
arrived.
In
 my
 government
 experience,
 this
 was
 the
 most
 irrational
 thing
 I
 ever
witnessed
 any
 President
 do.
 It
 called
 to
 mind
 Kelly’s
 question
 to
 me:
 what
would
 happen
 if
 we
 ever
 got
 into
 a
 real
 crisis
 with
 Trump
 as
 President?
Well,
we
now
had
one,
and
Trump
had
behaved
bizarrely,
just
as
Kelly
had
feared.
 As
 I
 arrived
 at
 the
 White
 House
 entrance
 on
 West
 Executive
Avenue,
shortly
after
seven
thirty
p.m.,
Kupperman
was
outside
to
greet
me
to
 say
 the
 strike
 was
 off.
 I
 went
 by
 my
 office
 to
 drop
 off
 my
 briefcase
 and
went
 straight
 to
 the
 Oval,
 where
 I
 found
 Cipollone,
 Eisenberg,
 and
 a
Mulvaney
 staffer.
 I
 had
 a
 thoroughly
 surreal
 conversation
 with
 Trump,
during
 which
 I
 learned
 that
 Eisenberg,
 on
 his
 own,
 had
 gone
 into
 the
 Oval
with
 the
 “one
 hundred
 fifty
 casualties”
 number,
 a
 figure
 drawn
 up
somewhere
 in
 the
 Defense
 Department
 (on
 which
 I
 learned
 more
 the
 next
day),
arguing
it
was
illegal
to
retaliate
in
such
a
disproportionate
way.
This
was
 all
 utter
 nonsense,
 both
 the
 so-called
 casualty
 figure,
 which
 no
 senior
official
 had
 examined,
 and
 the
 legal
 argument,
 which
 was
 a
 grotesque
misstatement
 of
 the
 proportionality
 principle.
 (After
 the
 event,
commentators
 circulated
 a
 quotation
 from
 Stephen
 Schwebel,
 former
 US
chief
 judge
 of
 the
 International
 Court
 of
 Justice,
 that
 “in
 the
 case
 of
 action
taken
for
the
specific
purpose
of
halting
and
repelling
an
armed
attack,
this
does
not
mean
that
the
action
should
be
more
or
less
commensurate
with
the 51 attack.”

Trump
 said
 he
 had
 called
 Dunford
 (probably
 the
 point
 where
 I tried
to
reach
him)
after
Eisenberg
spoke
to
him,
and
Dunford
didn’t
dispute the
 decision.
 Dunford
 told
 me
 the
 next
 day
 this
 was
 incorrect,
 but
 the damage
was
already
done.
I
was
at
a
loss
for
words,
which
must
have
been apparent
 to
 everyone

in
 the
 Oval.
 I
 tried
 to
 explain
 that
 the
 purported

“casualty”
 figures
 were
 almost
 entirely
 conjectural,
 but
 Trump
 wasn’t listening.
 He
 had
 in
 mind
 pictures
 of
 a
 hundred
 fifty
 body
 bags,
 and
 there was
 no
 explaining
 to
 be
 done.
 He
 offered
 no
 other
 justification,
 simply repeating
 his
 worry
 about
 television
 pictures
 of
 dead
 Iranians.
 Trump
 said finally,
“Don’t
worry,
we
can
always
attack
later,
and
if
we
do
it’ll
be
much tougher,”
a
promise
worth
exactly
what
I
paid
for
it.